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The whole thing is truly barbarism, and triumphs as such even over its own barbaric 
spirit. 
— Theodor W. Adorno 
 
Adorno’s use of the term “barbarism” has probably been most often referred to in the 
context of his much-cited dictum that “to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (Adorno 
1983: 34). While, nowadays, the term is usually and fortunately presented within the 
broader context of his works, his intended meaning was frequently misunderstood 
particularly after Adorno had articulated it for the first time. 
For clarity, the aforementioned dictum was not a verdict intended to silence poets or 
artists. It was rearticulated a few times by Adorno—specifically in response to Celan’s 
poetry—who calls for arts and culture to respond from within and in the face of an 
inescapable aporetic condition. Namely, to write poetry after Auschwitz means to write 
from within a differend—a radical chasm between the signifier and the signified that one 
neither ought nor could overcome via writing or aesthetic means in general. Yet, poetry 
(and also art and thinking, per se) as a form of active engagement with sociopolitical 
realities, has to respond to the ungraspable (i.e., the Holocaust); it cannot simply avoid 
doing so. It permanently has to speak whilst knowing that it will never reach the addressee; 
that it must fail in speaking. 
While much controversy prevailed over the dictum as a whole, little attention has been 
devoted to the term “barbarism” implied therein. However, understanding the concept in 
the broader dimensions underpinning Adorno’s (and partly, Horkheimer’s) usage of it is 
crucial for fully grasping the dictum. Most importantly, the miscellaneousness of 
“barbarism” touches upon a myriad of issues characteristic of Adorno’s overall theoretical 
venture. Namely, the term reoccurs in the context of his critiques of technical rationality, 
of mass culture, and of progress. In short, in his radical critique of the Enlightenment as 
adhering to an exclusionary form of instrumental reason. “Barbarism,” while never 
explicitly defined by Adorno, can thus be considered to, at the very least, implicitly address 
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the complexity of his critical philosophy as a whole. The term appears not only in 
“Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft,” where it was articulated in relation to the aforementioned 
dictum, but also in most of his major works, Negative Dialectics, Minima Moralia, The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment and, in what many consider to be his (posthumous) magnum 
opus, Aesthetic Theory. 
I contend that there are four diverging yet intertwined dimensions that underpin Adorno’s 
usage of the term, all of which primarily reflect his radical and permanently present call to 
face infinite ethico-political responsibility in the face of an irreversible past. This call 
concerns not only the arts or culture alone, but also involves science and politics — the 
society as a whole conceived of as a center that relentlessly excludes peripheries. In 
essence, it concerns our very own engagement with socio-political realities. 
 
I 
The first and probably most obvious dimension is related to the Holocaust as the utmost 
expression of barbarism. Connected to this dimension is a fundamental aporetic condition, 
that is, we live on in spite of Auschwitz, which, as the “ultimate end”, would logically 
prohibit any sort of living on in its aftermath. A certain barbarism is thus, per se, implied 
in our very being in an era post-Auschwitz. Any single word is a confirmation that life can 
go on after; any articulation of a concept or term relentlessly affirms what would have to 
be radically negated, but what can no longer be negated as the negation is no longer 
available to us. The past cannot be reversed. To put it bluntly, a consequence of this is that 
the whole (i.e., being) itself is barbaric (cf. Adorno 2005b: 107); this implies that “nothing 
less than all things are barbaric” (Hullot-Kentor 2010: 23)—another facet of the dictum 
“to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.” In one very general sense, it is barbaric simply 
because anything one could think of is barbaric; thinking itself is barbaric as it is a mode 
of continuous existence. Thus everything is barbaric: to write, to breath, to live—
specifically, to live-on. 
 
II 
The second sense refers to the fact that culture itself—and with it, philosophy—was 
incapable of preventing Auschwitz from happening (Adorno 2005a: 366). Moreover, not 
only has culture not prevented it, it, at times, even proactively contributed to Nazism and 
thereby became complicit in a much more radical sense. (This assertion seems most 
obvious in Adorno’s resolute and lifelong rejection of Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological 
“Jargon”, which applied not only to Heidegger’s own writings but, foremost, to different 
strands of Heideggerianism.) 
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Culture and philosophy, being dimensions of living-on after the failure of the 
Enlightenment, are also, in this sense, ultimately barbaric. Adorno writes: 
Auschwitz irrefutably demonstrated the failure of culture. That it could happen in the 
midst of all the traditions of philosophy, art and the enlightening sciences, says more than 
merely that these, the Spirit, was not capable of seizing and changing human beings. […] 
Whoever pleads for the preservation of a radically culpable and shabby culture turns into 
its accomplice, while those who renounce culture altogether immediately promote the 
barbarism, which culture reveals itself to be. (2005a: 358) 
*** 
 
As I mentioned earlier, in spite of frequently alluding to a barbaric whole (in both (I) a 
general sense and (II) in relation to culture as a specific mode of living-on) Adorno is not 
attempting to silence culture, arts or philosophy. What he termed a “New Categorical 
Imperative” attests much to this. The articulation of this imperative in his Negative 
Dialectics can best be seen as his own response to the more general barbaric condition 
expanded upon in (I) and (II). Imposed upon “unfree mankind” by Hitler (cf. Adorno 
(2005a: 365), this imperative demands that individuals “arrange their thoughts and 
actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen” (2005a: 
365). Initially striking is Adorno’s assumption—much expanded upon with Horkheimer in 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment—that men are “unfree”, meaning that they are far from 
having successfully released themselves from self-incurred tutelage. Auschwitz had finally 
proven that the alleged linear process of “civilization” had not suspended barbarism—far 
from it. Its relentless and irrational suppression has not served to overcome it; rather its 
ignorance reinforced its return in the form of utmost excess with the result of turning an 
envisioned universally enlightened end-state into a radical disaster eliminating any 
possible allusion to universality as such. 
Consequently, Horkheimer and Adorno attest that we can no longer hope for salvation in 
simply appealing to alleged universal reason (the Kantian Vernunft). No means exist in 
which men could ever be freed (not to mention a means in which they could free 
themselves) from the general, intrinsically barbaric condition in the first general sense 
mentioned. However, rather than reclaiming a hopelessly lost universality, our 
responsibility in light of the new categorical imperative is first and foremost to confront 
ourselves with our own irreparable failure. 
In spite of this, it is crucial to acknowledge that Adorno hints at potential unbarbaric 
modes of responses to the fundamentally barbaric general condition mentioned, and it is 
these that we ought to concentrate on as well as respond to; the New Categorical 
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Imperative which so emphatically calls not solely on our thoughts but also, and 
particularly, on our actions that goes along with the demand to “restore an unbarbaric 
condition” (2005b: 50). Thus, in spite of the whole being barbaric, the “sole adequate 
praxis after Auschwitz is to put all energies toward working our way out of barbarism” 
(2005b: 268). Practically, this must, of course, remain utopian in light of the whole being 
inevitably barbaric; however, there is a sense in which we could at least work toward a 
threshold pointing toward this impossible utopian restoration. Adorno envisions a 
condition for which there is no locus, which is why it is utopian in the very literal sense of 
the term’s origin. There is merely a nonplace, a u-topos for it. In this sense, it guides our 
actions and thoughts via calling on our responsibility from within an aporetic condition. 
Our responsibility—in spite of the whole being barbaric—is then, finally, to decode those 
peculiar barbaric impetuses that prevail within what Adorno and Horkheimer refer to as 
“new barbarism.” These occur in the context of cultural-political modes of being that are 
more specific than the general “barbaric condition” in which we adhere (in the sense that 
we have decided to live on after the ultimate end). Adorno’s implicit call to respond to 
specific barbaric impetuses that still constitute the sociopolitical has consequences 
regarding our modes of reasoning on the one hand (a thought that dominates much of his 
Negative Dialectics and his Einführung in die Dialektik) and the ways in which we relate 
and respond to processes of reification on the other (most explicitly articulated in The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment and in his writings and commentaries on the culture industry). 
 
III 
Adorno’s mode of thinking could potentially respond to this new imperative as 
permanently aware of a radical chasm between the object and the concept (Begriff in 
Hegel’s sense). In other words, a synthesis between both is no longer attainable. Adorno 
calls emphatically for a mode of thinking that avoids a position that deems itself superior 
to what it attempts to grasp. This thought is surprisingly close to Derrida (even though it 
implies a different epistemological movement): The object always escapes the concept that 
tries to subsume it. Consequently, to reason in a manner which diverges from barbarism—
Adorno actually terms this “the unbarbaric side of philosophy”—is conditioned upon a 
“tacit awareness of the element of irresponsibility, of blitheness springing from the 
volatility of thought, which forever escapes what it judges” (2005b: 127). 
Adorno contends reasoning always risks becoming totalitarian. It always involves the 
judging, naming and conceptualizing of some other. Any concept, too, risks losing peculiar 
heterogeneities and potential ambiguities that adhere to the object. By way of example, the 
term “society” (or, Gesellschaft in German) attempts to subsume an extremely ambivalent 
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and ever-changing actuality into an allegedly coherent concept (cf. Adorno 1972: 9–19). In 
other words, there is always a considerable and unavoidable amount of violence exerted in 
the processual course of conceptualization (Begriffsbildung), which cannot but abstract 
from and thereby reduce the objects it perceives. (In the Einführung in die Dialektik, a 
series of lectures held at the University of Frankfurt am Main, Germany, in 1958, Adorno 
frequently uses the expression “does violence to the Object” [“dem Gegenstand Gewalt 
antun,” cf. Adorno 1958: 297.]) 
The thinking and reasoning subject that loses awareness of this fundamental 
epistemological aporia becomes inevitably hegemonic, dogmatic and, therefore, 
totalitarian in the sense of promulgating a mode of reasoning that subscribes to two 
extremely problematic modes of irresponsible abstractionism: (A) a positivistic, scientific, 
quantifying mode of thinking, as well as (B) a bureaucratic, disengaged, unworldly way of 
being and acting. To the contrary, an unbarbaric mode of thinking refrains from 
deductions; it does not seek security in fundamental “firsts” or absolutes in the sense of a 
prima philosophia. 
One passage articulated in his Einführung in die Dialektik sums this up nicely: The 
relation between the universal and the particular, Adorno asserts here, is something “over 
which the thinking being properly has no power” (“worüber der Denkende eigentlich keine 
Macht hat” [1958: 241]), and to pertain to this powerlessness toward the object is—
strikingly—a “criterion of truth” (ibid.). Any consolidating synthesis reconciling that over 
which I am in truth powerless would thus by necessity imply a considerable amount of 
force. To put it in Adorno’s terms, a synthesis would be “applied” to the object by the 
“arbitrariness of ordering thought” (“von der Willkür des ordnenden Denkens […] 
aufgeprägt” (1958: 242)). 
To avoid this quasi-hegemonic stance implied in “ordering thought”, Adorno subscribes to 
a very idiosyncratic perspectivism—one that is always attentive and capable of responding 
to the unexpected, whilst remaining aware of the need for concepts—even if Adorno, at 
points, seems to be calling for an almost rhizomatic mode of thought. While Adorno 
frequently alludes to “labyrinthine paths” and even speaks of “subtarranean corridors” and 
“inter-related models” (Adorno 1958: 241), he still, strikingly, adheres to the picture of 
paths. What he hints at could thus probably best be imagined as akin to Paul Klee’s 
illustrated quasi-labyrinth in Haupt- und Nebenwege (1929), where a major path is still 
graspable which allows for a myriad of minor paths ending in uncertain horizons. This 
arguably separates Adorno from Deleuze’s rhizome. Adorno does not go so far as to call for 
thinking without concepts; for him, there is no such thing as an image- or concept-less 
thought, and neither should there be one in spite of the radical chasm between object and 
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subject. In essence, what Adorno hints at in the very last consequence is a thinking that 
applies the critical force of reason onto itself as a reflection on an Enlightenment tradition 
that has lost its own consciousness, having thereby become, to a certain extent, alienated 
from itself. 
 
IV 
The last dimension within which a “new barbarism” becomes most clearly evident is in the 
context of Adorno’s rejection of the new rise of capitalism’s massive culture industry that 
he closely witnessed in the late 1930s and 40s during his exile in the US. During this period, 
barbarism reoccurred in the hegemonic modes of fabrication of goods, of massification of 
cultural objects. The ever-expanding market as a constantly growing field that so quickly 
entered the sociopolitical could only reveal an implicit complicity with barbarism in that it 
was entrenched in an ideology related to a system trying to control a mass. It promoted a 
form of culture that prioritized sameness over critique and thoughtless enjoyment over an 
urgently needed, committed confrontation with actualities. 
None of what Adorno saw emerging in capitalist culture was, to his account, in any way 
responsive to the ultimate peak of barbarism itself (i.e., the Holocaust as the ultimately 
destructive Ereignis), and, in this way, was non-responsive to his newly formulated 
imperative. He saw too little (if any) theoretical and practical preoccupation with culture’s 
own complicity in light of Auschwitz, specifically after WWII. To the contrary, capitalism’s 
relentless production of sameness (what Adorno frequently termed the “Always-the-
same”) inevitably contributed to total homogeneity which excluded otherness and, with it, 
non-identicality. The Culture Industry again formed a mass in spite of its emphatic 
propagations of liberty on the grounds of an alleged emancipation of the general, as 
discussed above. 
Far removed, however, Adorno was aware that it, in truth, solely engaged in infinite 
production cycles at the expense of actual potentialities for emancipation and thereby 
reinforced the whole’s overall irrationality—and thus its falsity—in its blind reliance on 
technological reason. According to Adorno, implied again was the assumption that 
rationality was superior to its other and alleged “cultivation” superior to alleged barbaric 
primitiveness. On the grounds of this assumption, capitalist mass culture could only 
continue to suppress yet not overcome its inherent barbaric impulse (in Freudian terms, it 
continued to produce its destructive discontents). The truth for Adorno was that it could, 
therefore, only concentrate the force of potentiality to destruction. Here, it is worth quoting 
at length one of Adorno’s remarks taken from Minima Moralia: 
If the nineteenth-century connoisseur only stayed for one act of an opera, partly for 
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the barbaric reason that he would allow no spectacle to shorten his dinner, barbarism has 
now reached a point, the possibility of escape to a dinner being cut off, where it cannot 
stuff itself full enough of culture. Every program must be sat through to the end, every 
best-seller read, every film seen in its first flush in the top Odeon. The abundance of 
commodities indiscriminately consumed is becoming calamitous. It makes it impossible 
to find one’s way, and just as in a gigantic department store one looks out for a guide, the 
population wedged between wares await their leader. (Adorno 2005b: 118–119) 
However, also in the context of capitalism’s barbarism—a theme so dominant in Adorno’s 
writings—one can find margins expressing a glimmer of hope for potential escape routes. 
Adorno, at points, calls for what he terms “barbaric asceticism…towards progress in 
technical means” and “mass culture” (2005b: 50). This glaring statement is vital regarding 
the contemporary cultural-political situation. How such “asceticism” might appear is 
hardly envisionable nowadays, which makes Adorno’s writings and a thorough reflection 
on his concept of barbarism with a focus on its sociopolitical connotations all the more 
pressing. 
The following remarks by Robert Hullot-Kentor (2010) are of striking significance in this 
respect: 
More than a half century after the publication of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, we know 
ourselves the addressee of Adorno’s work in a way that we could hardly have realized a 
decade ago. For the interregnum of the post-war years is over. We are experiencing a return 
of the great fear, as if it never ended—and perhaps it never did. We are, without a doubt, 
the occupants of the most catastrophic moment in the whole of human history, in all of 
natural history, and we cannot get our wits about ourselves. What is being decided right 
now for all surviving generations including our own, is the exact sum total of the 
irreversible remainder, the unalterable “How it might have been”. 
 
Anna- Verena Nosthoff, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität, Frankfurt. 
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